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The American Way of War, Small Wars, & U.S. Military Transformation
The American way of war is a popular topic of debate among military thinkers. Many argue for a singular strategy or way of war for the U.S. military. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has driven the Department of Defense (DoD) headlong into his vision of a military transformation that values technology, speed, and flexibility. His noble goal is to prepare the military to fight whatever future threat may arise. This transformation does not intend to promote a singular way of war. Yet in the changes it emphasizes, it favors capabilities better suited for strategies of annihilation and large-scale conflict more than it creates capabilities for small wars. Real military transformation must include more than advanced technologies, organizations, and doctrines. It should offer additional military options not just improvements to options that already exist. Transformation must push the notion of flexibility to the point that U.S. strategy is open and adaptable enough so there is no single American way of war. U.S. response to threats should be integrated, measured, and tailored to deal with the enemies quickly, decisively, but completely with a strategic end-state for peace and stability in mind. This paper is organized into three sections. Section one discusses the current American way of war and its clash with the modern generation of warfare. Section two deals with the U.S. military transformation and its shortcomings. Section three addresses true U.S. transformation needs and the military attitudes and actions required to meet the requirement for a new American way of war flexible enough to include small wars.
In this paper, large wars are defined as total wars such as the Civil War and World War II.
Some limited wars may be included in the large war category if they involve two or more major forces engaging in conventional warfare. The Korean War and first Gulf War are examples.
Small wars are generally anything other than large wars. They include conflicts where one side possesses a dramatically larger military force than the other or where the battles are predominantly asymmetric. Small wars also include counterinsurgency, stabilization, nationbuilding, peacekeeping, reconstruction, security operations, or similar missions. This concept reached its zenith in the first Gulf War where Colonel John Warden's theories of parallel attack and strategic centers of gravity (COGs) helped to rapidly and decisively destroy the Iraqi military. 3 The major combat phases of OIF again illustrated America's desire and ability to overwhelm its adversary and cemented within its military the annihilation strategy of rapid decisive operations (RDO). 4 Critics of Weigley's thesis argue America has engaged its military in many more limited conflicts or "small wars" than in conflicts in which complete destruction of the enemy was the goal. 5 Max Boot contends annihilation is only one way of American warfare and that "there is another, less celebrated tradition in U.S. history-a tradition of fighting small wars." 6 He argues that in many of America's small wars, its strategies were haphazard and "designed not to occupy territory but to 'learn 'em a lesson.'" 7 Boot and others criticize U.S. strategy "in which a preoccupation with the 'BIG WAR' has led us to ignore the 'little wars' requirements for minimal use of firepower, restraint in campaigning and patience over the protracted nature of the contest." 8 Boot explains:
I. An
These [small wars] had seldom been popular with those called to carry them out. It should not be hard to see why. True, many of these operations offer some chance of glory, an opportunity eagerly seized by the likes of Stephen Decatur, Fredrick Funston, and Herman Hanneken. But such glory is more fleeting than most. Whereas the generals who lead big name armies in big wars-from Sherman to Schwartzkopfremain household names, who now remembers Smedley Butler, John Rogers, or J. Franklin Bell? True soldiers naturally want to prove their mettle fighting against other professional soldiers. True warriors would like nothing better than to take part in a clash of armies…where martial skill can be displayed in its 'pure' form, without worrying about nettlesome political complications. 9 This is surely Weigley's unspoken point; U.S. military leaders are reluctant to risk resources and lives in conflicts where non-military factors, like political will, might steal victory from military success. They thus focus all of their intellectual and material resources on strategies of annihilation and like Jomini, view small wars as "too destructive, too costly, and uncontrollable to be part of any scientific study of strategy." 10 As Boot describes it, "the primary characteristic of small wars is that there is no obvious field of battle; there are only areas to be controlled, civilians to be protected, hidden foes to be subdued. Soldiers must figure out who the enemy is before killing him; make a mistake and, like Major Littleton W. American way of war that has become a strategy of annihilation or no war at all.
b. Clash of Generations
Given America's narrow focus on large-scale conflict and its overwhelmingly superior capabilities to wage such wars, it is unlikely that an enemy will rise to challenge the U.S. headon force-on-force. It is more likely challengers of American policies or presence will resort to indirect or asymmetric means. America's adversaries know small wars are the only kind it has ever lost. This form of warfare also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It continues to exhaust Russia in Chechnya and the U.S. in Iraq and
Afghanistan. These successes against major powers by much weaker opponents makes it essential to understand and adapt to small wars. 17 The threats posed by the new "geostrategic realities" render the Powell Doctrine obsolete 18 and America can no longer ignore small war necessities and effectively defend its interests. The world is in a period when conventional war between states is unlikely, but mounting global discontent arising from globalization, slow economic development, political, economic, and social unrest, widespread anger and resentment, environmental decay, population pressure, transnational organized crime, and the widespread availability of arms makes insurgency common and strategically significant. 19 Given this new global strategic balance, some question the necessity to engage in small wars especially when there are few historical examples where foreign powers have won decisively or achieved their desired, long-term results in such conflicts. 20 With failure in small wars so common, might the Powell Doctrine still apply? The answer is powerful nations lose small wars because they are unprepared to wage them. Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz, accepted small wars as an important part of a nation's military strategy and further recognized it as a drawn-out affair strongly influenced by the national character of the states involved. 21 Retired Army General
Montgomery Meigs agrees. While he concedes Vietnam left many military thinkers averse to
anything but classical military operations, he also asserts the military cannot be saved only to fight the next world war and must adjust "to prevent the benefits of unconventional conflict by adapting to the current reality." 22 The new "geostrategic realities" have created a world where global terrorism and massive humanitarian crises cannot be ignored. In the past, small wars have been "background noise" but now they are "strategically significant, undercutting regional stability, drawing outsiders into direct conflict, and spawning humanitarian disasters." 23 Even small regional insurgencies can be vital to U.S. economic and security interests.
Jason Vest argues U.S. military leaders have exhibited "willful ignorance" by continuously ignoring the lessons of small wars and their lack of preparation for the insurgency in Iraq. 24 U.S. military infatuation with speed and its aversion to small wars go hand in glove. Dr.
Thomas Hughes explores the military obsession with speed and asserts it was not always so:
Rapidity was not always a touchstone in American military thought, despite positive references to it in many of the strategic analyses favored by the Pentagon. In the War of Independence, George Washington's Continental Army leveraged a patient, incremental, and modulated campaign against the world's greatest military force. Eventually, the British Empire decided that further hostilities in the New World were not in its interests. During the Civil War, the Anaconda Plan reflected the Union Army's strategic preference to defeat the Confederacy through a slow and deliberate squeezing; it was the South, the weaker military power, that sought a swift outcome on the battlefield. Throughout the frontier wars, which stretched from well before independence to shortly before 1900, the American Army marched westward no faster than expanding white settlement required. 41 Hughes suggests America's desire for speed gathered momentum in the twentieth century with expanding strategic obligations and help from speed-minded airpower theorists like General
Billy Mitchell. The need for speed took root in the military psyche during the Cold War when, for the first time in history, widespread destruction was possible at a moment's notice. Finally, the Vietnam experience appeared to validate this mindset as the gradual, limited conflict resulted in U.S. failure to achieve its objectives. The Powell Doctrine sprang, in part, from this inertia. dominance, enemies will adopt asymmetric styles and moral ambiguities. America must hence be prepared to fight slow, deliberate, and even indecisive conflicts. 44 The "old American way of war" that relied on "gathering maximum manpower and materiel, hurling them into the maelstrom, and counting on swift, crushing victory" works well against conventional foes but is "nothing short of disastrous when fighting insurgents." 45 But patience works against America's cultural grain. Former Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall asserted Americans cannot fight a 7-years war 46 and this lack of patience is a distinct disadvantage in small wars against other cultures. Western democracies highly value "military greatness which is brilliant and sudden. On the Arab street, however, a rapid dominance zeitgeist does not resonate." In this context, a strategy predicated on speed can be narrow-minded. "The Pentagon's decree for speed across all levels of war commits a cardinal sin of strategy by assuming a consistent value of velocity between ally and adversary…In making speed a mandated weapon in its repertoire, the Pentagon makes patience an asymmetric threat in the quivers of those who would wait out an impulsive America." 51 Effective small war strategies require coherent, patient action. The U.S. cannot force its adversaries to fight the short, high-tech wars it easily dominates. America must learn to fight small wars with small wars strategies.
52
U.S. political leaders have begun to recognize the need for patience included in the strategy mix that has long favored speed and dominance. In his National Security Strategy, President
Bush asserts that against some threats, "progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes-some seen, some unseen" 53 and "there will be no quick or easy end" to some of our conflicts. 54 Contrary to General Marshall, President Bush asks for American patience:
"Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment…we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more." 55 The President seems to understand what many U.S. military leaders do not; "to date, no effort at enforced democratization has been brought to successful conclusion in less than seven years." 56 Impatience with long-term conflicts has interfered with success. 57 Hughes asserts that speed and overwhelming force may produce short-term results but may also prove counterproductive "when matched against the very difficult internal problems that form the underlying problems in target countries." 58
b. Strategic End State Still Unaddressed
The need for patience in small wars creates a "tension between the ideal rapid dominance approach captured in the public imagination and the exigencies of fighting an insurgency." 59 One author suggests this tension results in an American way of battle more than a way of war:
"The American way of war tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs, whether on the scale of major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes." 60 Clausewitz: "If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace be a bad one, containing the germs of another war." 73 The first Gulf War and the resumption of hostilities in OIF seem to illustrate this problem.
"Conflict termination and resolution clearly are not the same thing. Conflict resolution is a long process…through advantageous conflict termination, however, the military can set the conditions for successful conflict resolution." 74 A desired end-state in U.S. conflicts is always a better state of peace but victorious conflict termination in defeat of enemy forces does not necessarily secure a better peace. The current U.S. strategy of annihilation does address the transition from decisive operations to post-conflict operations. There is no provision for simultaneous decisive combat and stability or security operations to impose our will upon an enemy that is no longer a coherent military force but has decomposed into insurgency. 75 The U.S. military's fixation with rapid and decisive combat and lack of end-state focus offers an inflexible, unimaginative military strategy. It has placed the greater investment in preparing for the types of conflict America least often faces 76 and forces the U.S. to relearn old lessons with each outbreak of a small war. 77 Failure to adapt has created a "one-size-fits-all" annihilation approach to American strategy that actually prolongs and exacerbates small wars.
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"Doctrine prepares warriors for the next war and is often a repeat of the last war's successful
experience. But what happens when the next opponent does not follow the script?" 79 General
Marshall warned, "The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feet on a well traveled road to ruin." 80 Admiral
Cebrowski agreed, "My biggest concern is that we will attempt to pursue the one best way. This would be a grave error. We don't want the one best warfighting concept. We want to have alternative, competing concepts with continuous debate…We need a new ethos which is tolerant of continuing debate at the operational, organization and tactical levels." 81 While the U.S. military must continue to prepare for the "big war", it can no longer afford to ignore the small missions it is certain to face in the meantime. 82 speed. Yet the insurgency that followed appears to have been an afterthought despite warnings from many analysts. 103 Encouraging innovation, and risk-taking will require a major shift in U.S. military culture. Popular myth says the military embraces these attributes, but history
shows that while such leadership is tolerated with successful generals, it is rarely encouraged. 104 Infatuation with the body-count metric and loss of public support are familiar aspects of the Vietnam conflict. Vietnam was followed by the first Gulf War and seemingly miraculous stealth and precision weapons, which dramatically minimized U.S. casualties and collateral damage.
These phenomenons have created a fixation with rapid dominance and casualty avoidance. This risk aversion is tied to the American way of war that calls for rapid annihilation of the enemyget in, get it done, and get out or don't go in at all. This attitude created a near impossible situation in Somalia where a quick strike against a warlord resulted in 19 U.S. casualties. The operational failure forced the U.S. to withdraw from an operation that had been a strategically successful to that point. 105 This added to U.S. casualty aversion that likely caused a reluctance to commit ground troops in Bosnia and Kosovo. This fear may also have been the root of U.S.
apathy to the mass genocide tragedy in Rwanda. Boot states a body-count metric can backfire cruelly. "If foreign enemies know that killing a few Americans will drive the U.S. out of their country, they are far more likely to target American soldiers and civilians…Every time U.S.
forces flee some country after suffering casualties, it make it less likely that the U.S. will be able to accomplish its objectives in the future without using force." 106 The rapid dominance success in the first Gulf War and the early phases of OIF prove speed and precision on the battlefield are still important capabilities. Yet a lack of casualties in any example should not dictate that America fight only when casualties can be avoided. Nor does it prove that strategic speed is required in every conflict. Speed is necessary in some scenarios but patience and persistence are required in others. This may include tolerating U.S. casualties. The ability to simply occupy a segment of territory without killing anyone is critical to small wars. 107 Ironically, swift and decisive military victories often lead to difficult post-conflict operations. 108 In small wars, U.S. strategic attacks are usually counterproductive in terms of winning hearts and minds. Local populations generally respond better to face-to-face security and peacekeeping forces willing to put themselves in harm's way than to unmanned and precision weapons. It's a perception of legitimacy issue. Patience to wait to react to aggression, measured reaction to defeat aggression, and a persistence to remain focused on desired objectives despite casualties increase perceived legitimacy. These are crucial U.S. military attributes that belong along side RDO in the U.S. arsenal.
While there is disagreement about blame for the insurgency in Iraq, most agree the U.S.
should have been better prepared for it. Most also agree the time to prepare for post-conflict operations is prior to and during conflict in close coordination with conflict planning itself. 
b. Transformation in Military Actions
The second cultural change required in the U.S. military, if it is to adapt and excel in small wars, is in actions regarding coordination, capabilities development, and training. The abundant literature about U.S. small wars failings commonly cites these areas as critical to success in current and future conflicts. With respect to coordination, most experts assert the need for better interagency coordination and cooperation between U.S. government agencies and cooperation with coalition partners and non-governmental organizations. With capabilities development, many experts cite a need for enhanced intelligence and information operations resources for better regional and local awareness and robust knowledge sharing within the DoD and among its interagency partners. Finally, most experts stress the need for better training for the U.S.
serviceman to broaden his expertise from beyond warfighting to cultural awareness, language expertise, and civic and economic skills. peacekeeping. 129 General Meigs advises, "Leaders need to be trained to recognize the warning signs and to expand their approaches to this new environment. We must provide them the tools to prevent the benefits of unconventional conflict by adapting to the current reality." 130 "Soldiers must master warfighting skills to secure terrain and towns while working peacefully with the local populace and, hopefully, persuading them that nonviolence is the best path to stability." 131 There is more to training than strategy and tactics. Sadly, much of the U.S. population, including the military, is culturally ignorant. The military's transformation must address this in training. Culture is important both internationally and organizationally. Awareness and sensitivity are important when working with other cultures. They are also important when working with other agencies with differing organizational cultures. 132 "Leader development and training must include increased cultural sensitivity and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries…with the ability to innovate and adapt." 133 "Leaders at all levels must understand and trust the capabilities of other agencies," therefore "professional education and training increasingly must be interagency and multinational." 134 Mr. Cordesman warns, "political legitimacy is measured in local terms, and not in terms of American ideology." He argues, effective warfighting demands recognition that regional allies may not value U.S. ideas on democracy. "In most of the world, 'legitimacy' has little to do with governments being elected, and a great deal to do with governments being popular." 135 To address these issues, military training should include: culture, language, law and civics, public administration, economics, and ethics. 136 This is in line with Directive 3000.05 which states, "foreign language skills, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels" This is not an all or nothing proposal. The military still needs the ability to dominate a conventional conflict but a balance must be struck to obtain the flexibility to conduct warfare at whatever level U.S enemies dictate. Boot says the Marines and Special Forces are better at small wars because they focus on people over technology. The Marines do enjoy the dominance of their aircraft, vehicles, and weapons but their focus is on combined arms flexibility to maximize capabilities against the full-spectrum of adversaries. They largely leave the procurement battles to the other services, sharing aircraft with the Navy and mechanized vehicles with the Army.
There are three COGs in Iraq: the Iraqi people, the American people, and the U.S. solider. 139 These COGs are human and cannot be secured by technology alone. The insurgency, with its political and ideological dimensions is far more human-centric than netcentric. Sensors, UAV, and ISR have value in Iraq, but they are not "magic bullets." 140 This "technical fetish mentality"
has not led to better cultural intelligence 141 or effectively addressed the key COG in most small wars, the local population. 142 To protect human-centric COGs, the U.S. cannot "blow up one building or square block to take out a few snipers or bombers, and sorry if anyone else gets killed in the process. It's not going to win us any friends. Stringing Baghdad with sensors or putting
Predators over all Iraq isn't going to stop this either. We'd be better off with a division of MP's and civil affairs specialists that knew the turf, backed by good native intelligence and police." 143 The Air Force, for example, tends to focus on the destructive side of airpower and not the constructive side, often more useful in small wars. 144 Boot states, "airpower, no matter how awesome, cannot police newly liberated countries-or build democratic governments." 145 Ground forces are needed to police populations and root out insurgents but airpower, with the proper mindset, can have an effective supporting role in this mission. Enhanced doctrine, compatible force structure, and employment planning tools, could help airpower be as useful in construction and stability as it is in destruction. 146 One idea is a manned vehicle with loiter capability equipped with high-tech sensors and low-tech loud speakers for crowd control and PSYOPS. One proposal is the old North American Rockwell OV-10D as a low-cost solution. It could loiter over hot spots to project power and presence and direct fire as needed. The two-seat vehicle could be manned at first, by an American and a local security officer for legitimacy and cultural awareness purposes. Later, the aircraft and its mission could be turned over completely to the local security force as U.S. presence is phased out. This proposal is much less expensive than many other airpower procurement projects, would provide legitimacy to the local U.S.
supported forces, and not threaten neighboring countries. 147 The goal is a human-centric focus for airpower solutions to address the human-centric nature of small wars.
d. Transformation in Action: Force Structure & Procurement.
To include small wars as a core military competency, spending of some tax dollars must change. Money must shift from some mega-expensive procurement programs into systems, research, and personnel development to improve small wars capabilities. The Air Force F-22A
and Navy Sea Basing platforms are awesome systems and needed to keep air and sea superiority against future conventional adversaries. Air and sea supremacy are vital U.S. interests and must never be taken for granted. These programs also provide jobs to thousands of congressional constituents. However, air and sea dominance systems have limited utility in counterinsurgency or nation-building. Perhaps these programs can be maintained by buying fewer weapon systems each year but over a greater number of years. America must continue to maintain the capabilities and advance the technologies these systems provide. However, keeping the production lines that
produce these systems open and creative should be the aim while the nation fights a global war against insurgent terrorists and not a mass of enemy troops riding in tanks, ships, and fighter jets.
The Army's procurement programs do not address small wars either. The strategicallyimmobile M1 tank is to be replaced by the Future Combat Systems (FCS). The Army's FCS goal is light, sustainable, maneuverable, high-firepower, netcentric vehicle capable of protecting the troops inside it. 148 The problem is the technology to build this enviable weapon system does not yet exist, will not for several years, and will be expensive when developed. 149 The Army's dilemma in seeking advanced technologies is which to pursue first in its quest to achieve mobility and survivability. 150 Most Army weapons systems rely on standoff "see-first-shootfirst" tactics. Outside of the well-armored (but still vulnerable from the rear 151 ) M1, the Army has sacrificed armor for speed, maneuverability, and sensors. The Bradley and Stryker vehicles have proven useful but vulnerable in rugged terrain and to artillery fire. 152 Lightly armored, netcentric vehicles may also prove vulnerable to information warfare and EMP weapons.
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Regardless, "see-first-shoot-first" is not optimal for small wars. Peacekeepers cannot shoot everyone who might harm them. Success in small wars means taking risks mitigated by the fact that U.S. soldiers have a good chance of survival even if an enemy opens fire. In many cases, it is highly desirable to allow the enemy to take the first shot. Otherwise, peacekeepers risk compromising their objectives and creating a crisis that might have been avoided. 154 In small wars, survivability and persistence are as important as speed and precision.
In addition to modifying procurement plans to maintain conventional dominance while integrating small wars capabilities, the military must also grapple with the force structure suited to obtain this objective. Should America create a separate small wars force or should the bulk of the responsibility fall to the current military force structure? A well-known stance on the subject of U.S. troops and small wars comes from Former Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles
Krulak. He referred to the challenges posed by small wars as the "three block war" or "contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks." 155 General
Krulak asserted marines should fight the "three block war" with the "strategic corporal."
Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability to make the right decision at the right time at the point of contact…without the direct supervision of senior leadership…[He] will be asked to deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats [and] will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require [him] to confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress-decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. 156 The role of "strategic corporal" is a huge burden to place on the individual soldier. In small wars, these young troops are forced to innovate on the fly where read-and-react decisions may mean not just life or death but national victory or defeat. Secretary Rumsfeld sides with General Krulak. He declares, "our troops need to be able to shift roles, on a block-by-block basis, serving as diplomats one moment, peacekeepers the next, and warfighters when under ambush, in order to win the peace and not just the battle." 157 Others disagree and advocate a separate peacekeeping force: "Americans should understand the consequences of substituting generals and Green Berets for diplomats, and nineteen-year old paratroopers for police and aid workers on nation-building missions." 158 One general finds it unreasonable to expect soldiers, highly trained for warfare, to develop the more intricate skills required for the hearts and minds campaign. He advocates leaving post-conflict operations to other organizations. 159 As a compromise, the best U.S. force structure to fight both the large and small wars of the future should be comprised of both well-trained strategic corporals and specialized small wars specialty units. Primarily conventional strategic corporals should be trained to deal with small wars missions and should support (or be supported by depending upon the specific situation) specialized units in small wars missions. This concept is not radically different from the current military structure. America already has unconventional capabilities in its Special Operations
Forces and small units in all the services that specialize in civil affairs, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and more. These small units should be enlarged and train together with the conventional forces as part of U.S. joint force capability. The Binnendiijk and Johnson paper advocates "lego-like" stabilization and reconstruction capabilities provided by two joint commands one active, and one reserve. The aim is modular, scalable, and flexible small wars capabilities within the U.S. forces. 160 Cordesman also supports a hybrid approach that includes civilianizing some military positions and military tour length adjustments to allow critical relationships with allies and local personnel to last longer. 161 Every successful military in history has relied on skilled leadership as a key factor enabling victory. The U.S. military has been blessed with many great leaders past and present. The question with small wars is at what level is leadership needed most? A critic of the military's structure remarked, "Do we really need three hundred and eighty-six generals in the Army, each with a staff that generates its own paperwork?" This critic also bemoans the industrial age military personnel system that is top heavy and hierarchical. 162 Brigadier Alwin-Foster is also critical of U.S. force structure, "weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a pre-disposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on." 163 He argues the lynchpin in decentralized operations that characterize small wars is the captain. 164 Others, like General Krulak argue that the key leadership rank is the non-commissioned officer (NCO). Few experts are clamoring for more generals. International conflicts in the past decade demonstrate the U.S. need for "leaders who can shift quickly from combat to stability operations and back again with an eye on winning both war and peace." 165 "Empowering and entrusting junior leaders to find durable solutions in their unique environments is the only effective way" to fight small wars. 166 Fewer high-salaried flag officers and flatter organizations would permit a needed increase in size of the junior officer and NCO corps to lead the "three block war" envisioned by General Krulak and Secretary Rumsfeld.
Conclusion
"The big wars, especially the Civil War and World War II, are celebrated in countless books, movies, and documentaries. As it happens, these were America's only experiences with total war in which the nation staked all of its blood and treasure to achieve the relatively quick and unconditional surrender of the enemy…but this is only one way of American war. There is another, less celebrated tradition in U.S. military history-a tradition of fighting small wars." 167 Counterinsurgency and reconstruction in Iraq is the latest U.S. small war experience and despite calls by some to withdraw, it is vital the U.S. does not leave until its objectives are fully met.
"When a superpower cuts and runs, its next mission becomes much harder to accomplish."
168
Leaving Iraq too soon would guarantee that strategic objectives are not met and, likely force reintervention to deal with future security problems. Osama bin Laden's rise partly resulted from abandoning Afghanistan too soon after foreign occupation in 1979. 169 Despite the lack of weapons of mass destruction or the removal of Saddam, OIF will be judged more by the U.S.
commitment to rebuild Iraq than by the purely military phase of the conflict. In accepting the small wars mission, the U.S. military faces some difficult tasks. The first is to seek strategic flexibility and recognize that patience and persistence in warfare can be as valuable as speed, precision, and dominance. The second task is to realize, "decisive military victory does not equal strategic success." 174 These tasks are part of a cultural challenge summarized by Brigadier Alwin-Foster:
The planned Army Transformation needs to focus less on generating warfighting capability and much more on:
• The realisation that all military activity is subordinate to political intent, and must be attuned accordingly: mere destruction of the enemy is not the answer.
• The development of a workforce that is genuinely adaptive to changes in purpose, as opposed to merely adapting to be even better at conventional warfighting.
• Keeping the lure of technology in perspective and realizing that the human component is the key to adaptability. 175 This highlights the need to focus more on people than technology. This human-centric approach applies not just to the U.S. soldier, but also to the adversary and local population. U.S.
doctrine is based on the concept of COGs but these are difficult to identify and target if you have a non-nodal enemy. 176 Netcentric is not a substitute for human-centric-it is more important to have effective local forces than more technology. 177 These ideas lead to tasks three and four: procurement changes to balance conventional and asymmetric capabilities and enhanced force structure and training. General Meigs summarizes:
Our challenge then is to develop an organizational concept that spans the two dimensions. We must continue to possess the forces and systems we need to provide conventional deterrence and, if deterrence fails, to win decisively. As they have been doing in low-intensity conflicts for the last decade, however, these same units must also be able to task organize on short warning into new structures to defeat opponents who seek to apply asymmetrical abilities in idiosyncratic approaches in unconventional settings. 
